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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. DANIEL ENGLISH, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Priority No. 16 
vs. 
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah Case NO. 900422-CA 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPEAL FROM THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) because this is an 
appeal from a final judgment and order in a civil matter in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. This matter was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court 
to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(4) in an order dated August 31, 1990. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Rental Agreement could be extended for an 
additional 36 months without a written addendum specifying the 
amount of rent to be paid, the term of the extension and signed 
by the parties. 
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2. Whether English deprived Standard of possession of the 
leased premises and is consequently barred from claiming an 
enforceable lease after August 31, 1988. 
3. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at 
trial to support the finding that Standard failed to return the 
premises to English in as good a condition as it was at the 
commencement of the Rental Agreement. 
4. Whether English's failure to notify Standard of damage 
and/or the necessity of refurbishing prior to English's 
commencing repairs and refurbishing precludes him from recovering 
related damages. 
Regarding questions of law, the appellate court accords no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions, and the standard of 
review is "correctness." City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 
P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1989). See Addendum hereto for full 
text. 
RELATED APPEAL 
Appellant believes that Century Park Offices, Ltd. v. 
William R. Bireley, Case No. 900462-CA, presently on appeal to 
this Court involves similar issues to the instant appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a landlord-tenant dispute. In 1982 
defendant/appellant, standard Optical company ("Standard"), and 
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plaintiff/respondent, W. Daniel English ("English"), entered into 
a written Rental Agreement for commercial space. On or about 
January 30, 1989, English filed the instant lawsuit against 
Standard. English claimed that Standard defaulted under the 
Rental Agreement by failing to pay rent due. English requested 
an award of damages for past and future rent and for expenses 
relating to repairs and re-renting of the leased premises. 
After discovery was conducted, a trial was held on 
December 21 and 22, 1989 in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy presiding. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment appealed from were entered on or about February 9, 1990. 
On or about February 15, 1990 Standard filed its Motion to Amend 
the Judgment on the general grounds of error in law, 
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, and abuse 
of discretion. After both parties submitted memoranda, the trial 
court entered its order denying Standard's motion to amend the 
judgment on May 17, 1990. On June 7, 1990 Standard filed a 
notice of appeal from the trial court's February 9, 1990 Judgment 
and the trial court's May 17, 1990 Order denying defendant's 
Motion to Amend the Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are undisputed and derived from the 
court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and from the Trial 
Transcript and Exhibits. 
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1. On August 10, 1982, English and standard entered into a 
written Lease Agreement for the lease of commercial real property 
and a building located at 3525 Market Street, West Valley City, 
Utah ("the leased premises"). See R. at 186 (Findings of Fact, f 
1). 
2. The Lease Agreement provides in relevant part: 
(a) To have and to hold said premises and 
office space under the terms of this 
agreement for a term of ten (10) years 
beginning on the first day of the month 
following written notice to Lessee from 
Lessor and terminating at midnight on the 
last day of the same month 10 years hence. 
(b) The Lessee does hereby unconditionally 
agree to pay his rent for the demise premises 
and to Lessor, or order, at West Valley City, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum of $1,000 
each month for 36 months with the first such 
installment to be due and payable on or 
before the first day of September, 1982, and 
each installment payment to be due thereafter 
on or before the same calendar day during the 
term of the agreement. A grace period of 
five days is given for the making of such 
installment payment. 
(c) The monthly rent specified in the 
sections above shall be negotiated every 36 
months. 
(o) The Lessee does hereby agree to return 
said premises back to the Lessor at the end 
of this lease term in as good a condition as 
the premises are at the commencement of this 
lease, with only ordinary wear and 
depreciation being accepted. 
(p) It is mutually agreed that in the event 
it becomes necessary for either party to 
enforce the terms of this agreement with 
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court action, after default, that the party 
determined to be in default will pay to the 
opposite party all court costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. 
See R. at 186-189 (Findings of Fact, H 2); Trial Exhibit 4P. 
For the Court's convenience, a copy of the 1982 Lease Agreement 
is included in the Addendum hereto. 
3. On or about September 1, 1985, plaintiff and defendant 
entered into a written addendum to the 1982 Rental Agreement 
specifying a monthly rent of $1,200 to be paid for the 36-month 
period beginning on September 1, 1985. See R. at 189 (Findings 
of Fact, f 3); Trial Exhibit 37D. For the Court's convenience a 
copy of the 1985 addendum is included in the Addendum to this 
Brief. 
4. At the time of execution of the written addendum to the 
1982 Rental Agreement, English understood that changes or 
amendments to the Agreement were required to be in writing and 
signed by the parties. See Trial Transcript, Volume III, 
pp. 12-13. 
5. Prior to June 1988, Standard understood the Rental 
Agreement term to expire at the end of August 1988, with an 
option to negotiate a renewal. See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, 
f 6). 
6. Standard kept all rental payments to English current 
through August 1988. See R. at 190, 191 (Findings of Fact, Ml 5, 
9 and 15). 
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7. On or about July 1, 1988, English met with 
Stephen Schubach ("Schubach"), president of Standard at English's 
office. Schubach then informed English that Standard intended to 
move out of the leased premises at the end of July. .See Trial 
Transcript, Volume I, pp. 82-83. 
8. On or about July 5, 1988, the parties began to discuss 
a new rental amount and the possibility of subletting the leased 
premises. See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, U 10). 
9. On or about July 18, 1988, Standard ceased doing 
business at the leased premises and moved out some of its 
personal property, see R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, n 10). 
10. The parties continued through August and September 1988 
to negotiate for a lease renewal at a new rental amount beginning 
September 1, 1988. See R. at 190-192 (Findings of Fact, 
Hit 10-17). 
11. On or about September 26, 1988, the parties met to 
negotiate rent and discuss the possibility of subletting the 
leased premises. The parties failed at that meeting to agree on 
a rental amount. See R. at 192 (Findings of Fact, f 17). 
12. Prior to October 18, 1988, English began negotiating 
with subcontractors to have extensive work done in the leased 
premises. See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 131. 
13. On or about October 18, 1988, English changed the locks 
on the leased premises. See R. at 193 (Findings of Fact, f 23); 
Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 132. 
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14. Before English changed the locks on the leased 
premises, he did not notify Standard or obtain Standard's 
consent. See Trial Transcript, Volume II, pp. 18-19. 
15. On October 20, 1988, English1s attorney, 
Gary Doctorman, wrote a letter to Standard. The letter stated 
that Standard was "in violation of the terms of the lease" and 
that if it desired to "remain in possession of the leased 
premises," it should make rent payments for the months of 
September and October. The amount of rent claimed due was not 
specified in the letter. See R. at 193 (Findings of Fact, U 25); 
Trial Exhibit 12P. 
16. As of October 20, 1988, the parties had failed to 
negotiate a lease renewal and rental amount. See R. at 194 
(Findings of Fact, f 26). 
17. The subcontractors hired by English began work on the 
interior of the leased premises in the latter part of 
October 1988. See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 45. 
18. Plaintiff never made any mention to Standard of damage 
to the leased premises or demanded repairs or cleaning of the 
premises at any time prior to November, 1988. See Trial 
Exhibits 11 and 12; and See Trial Transcript, Volume II, p. 63. 
19. On November 2, 1988, Schubach called English at his 
home and told English that Standard would pay $1,000 per month. 
In the same conversation, English asked Schubach to have 
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Standard's property removed from the leased premises. See R. at 
194 (Findings of Fact, fl 28); Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 140. 
20. At the time of his November 2, 1988 telephone 
conversation with English, Schubach was unaware that English had 
changed the locks to the leased premises and engaged contractors 
to do work in the premises. Trial Transcript, Volume II, p. 64. 
21. On or about November 7, 1988, Klaus Rathke, an employee 
of Standard ("Rathke"), met with English at the leased premises. 
At that time, Rathke asked English for a key to the premises so 
that Standard's workmen could get into the premises to remove the 
remaining pieces of Standard's property. See Trial Transcript, 
Volume I, p. 139. 
22. Sometime shortly after the November 7, 1988 meeting 
with Rathke, employees of Standard obtained a key to the premises 
from English's secretary and removed Standard's remaining 
property from the premises. See Trial Transcript, Volume I, 
p. 139. 
23. Standard did not attempt to enter the leased premises 
again until December 16, 1988 when Rathke again met with English 
in the leased premises at English's request. At that meeting, 
English walked Rathke through the premises to show him the 
extensive work he had done on the premises since October 1988. 
See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 145. 
24. On or about November 21, 1988, English received a check 
from Standard for $1,600. See Trial Transcript, Volume I, 
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p. 141; Trial Exhibit 17P. A copy of this check is included in 
the Addendum hereto. 
25. On December 2, 1988 English sent a letter to Standard 
demanding payments for the months of October, November and 
December and informing standard that he had three prospective 
tenants and was nearing completion refurbishing the premises. 
Trial Exhibit 13P. A copy of this letter is included in the 
Addendum hereto. 
26. On or about December 5, 1988, English received a check 
dated December 1, 1988 from standard in the amount of $1,000. 
See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 142; Trial Exhibit 18P. A 
copy of this check is included in the Addendum hereto. 
27. English did not endorse the checks received from 
Standard on November 21 and December 5, 1988, but did negotiate 
them. See Trial Transcript, Volume I, pp. 141-143; Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 17 and 18. See Addendum hereto. 
28. English never made any demand on Standard to return the 
premises to the condition in which it had been at the 
commencement of the 1982 Lease Agreement. See Trial Transcript, 
Volume II, p. 23. 
29. English's understanding of the Lease Agreement was that 
after October 5, 1988, Standard had no rights under the lease. 
See Trial Transcript, Volume II, p. 23. 
30. After a bench trial was held in this action on 
December 21 and 22, 1989, the trial court found that "pursuant to 
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the terms of the written lease, the parties negotiated at the end 
of the second thirty-six month term and on or about November 2, 
1988 the parties agreed that the rent for the next thirty-six 
month term from September 1, 1988 to August 1, 1991 would be 
$1,000.00 per month." R. at 197 (Conclusions of Law, 1). 
31. The trial court further found that "Standard Optical 
failed to pay the rent as agreed and breached the written lease." 
And that "Standard Optical breached the written Lease Agreement 
between the parties as they failed to maintain and repair the 
premises, including the furnace . . . " R. at 198 (Conclusions of 
Law, Jin 2 and 3) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in determining that the Rental 
Agreement could be extended for an additional 36 months without a 
written addendum signed by English and specifying the amount of 
rent to be paid and the term of the extension. Standard1s checks 
together with English's December 2, 1988 demand letter do not 
satisfy the requirements of statute of frauds, Utah Code Ann. S 
25-5-1. Under the statute of frauds and fundamental principles 
of contract law, Standard's oral agreement to pay English $1,000 
per month was insufficient to extend the Rental Agreement for an 
additional term of years. English deprived Standard of 
possession of the leased premises and in doing so he failed to 
provide consideration for an extension of the lease term. 
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English was entitled only to receive the leased premises in 
as good a condition as they were at the commencement of the lease 
with only ordinary wear and depreciation being accepted. There 
was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support the trial 
court's finding that Standard failed to return the premises to 
English in as good a condition as it was in at the commencement 
of the Rental Agreement. Furthermore, English's failure to notify 
Standard of damage and/or the necessity of refurbishing prior to 
English's commencing repairs and refurbishing precludes him from 
recovering related damages. 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ENFORCEABLE LEASE BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES AFTER AUGUST 1988. 
Despite the stated 10-year term in the Lease Agreement 
entered into by the parties in 1982, the lease was an enforceable 
contract only with respect to the terms for which a rental amount 
has been agreed upon. In effect, there was an option to renew 
the lease every 36 months, provided the parties could agree upon 
the monthly rent. This was standard's understanding of the 
effect of the lease and the basis for the testimony at trial that 
Standard informed English that they believed the lease terminated 
on September 1988. See Trial Transcript, Volume I, p. 82. 
Standard's interpretation of the Lease Agreement is 
supported by fundamental principles of contract law. 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of 
any contract is that there be a meeting of 
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the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, 
with sufficient definiteness to be 
enforced . . . 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427 (Utah 1961). Even where the 
parties may believe themselves bound under a contract, if the 
terms of the contract are so vague and indefinite that there is 
no basis or standard for determining whether the agreement had 
been kept or broken, or to fashion a remedy, and where there are 
no means by which the terms may be certain, then there is no 
enforceable contract. Candid Productions, Inc. v. International 
Skating Union, 530 F.Supp. 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Several courts 
have applied these fundamental principles of contract law to 
contracts for the lease of real property. See e.g., Honolulu 
Water Front Ltd. Partnership v. Aloha Tower Development Corp., 
692 F. Supp. 1230 (Dist. Hawaii, 1988). 
There are three essential elements in an agreement for a 
lease of real property: (1) a description of the property, (2) 
the duration of the term, and (3) the rental consideration. 
Karamanos v. Hamm, 513 P.2d 761, 762 (Oregon 1973). 
It is well settled in the common law of 
contracts that a mere agreement to agree, in 
which a material term is left open for future 
negotiation, is unenforceable. This is 
especially true with respect to the amount to 
be paid for the sale or lease of real 
property. 
Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 436 N.Y.S.2d 
247 (1981). 
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It is well-established that because the amount of rent is an 
essential term to a contract for the lease of real property, 
leases such as the 1982 Lease Agreement in this case, providing 
for future negotiation of the rent with no specified method for 
determining the amount, are unenforceable. Honolulu Water Front, 
692 F.Supp 1230, 1235; Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 
(Utah 1988); Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 
1317 (Utah 1976); Slayter v. Pasley, 264 P.2d 444 (Oregon 1953); 
Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247. This is the 
majority position on this issue and it has been expressly adopted 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Pingree v. Continental Group of 
Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). Cottonwood Mall Co., 767 
P.2d at 502. 
In Pingree a lease granted the lessee the option to renew 
for two separate additional five-year terms upon the same terms 
and conditions of the original lease, except that the rental 
amount would be renegotiated subject to a cap of $900 per month. 
The lease further provided the factors of tax increase, cost of 
business increases or decreases, business volume and success, 
insurance costs and other reasonable allowances, would be the 
basis for the terms of negotiation. Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1320. 
When the time for renewal arose, the parties were unable to agree 
upon rent and the lessor brought an action to recover possession. 
The lessee counterclaimed for enforcement of a five-year period 
at $500 per month which was the amount the lessee had insisted 
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upon during negotiation. The Utah Supreme Court held that the 
option to renew was too vague and indefinite to be enforceable. 
Id. 
The court in Pingree followed a majority rule set forth by 
an Oregon court in Slayter v. Pasley which stated: 
A provision for the extension or renewal of a 
lease must specify the time the lease is to 
extend and the rate of rent to be paid with 
such a degree of certainty and definiteness 
that nothing is left to future determination. 
If it falls short of this requirement it is 
not enforceable. 
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1321 (citing Slayter, 264 P.2d 444, 446 
(Oregon 1953)). Following Slayter, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly refused to fix a reasonable rent for the parties when 
their own negotiations failed. Pingree, 558 P.2d 1317; 
Cottonwood Mall Company, 767 P.2d at 502. 
Under Pingree, the Lease Agreement in the instant case 
created no more than a 36-month lease with an option to renew 
every 36 months. Applying the majority rule adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, the Lease Agreement was not enforceable when the 
parties failed to agree upon a rental amount and term beginning 
on September 1, 1988. 
The only way the Lease Agreement could be enforced after 
August 1988 was if the parties entered into a written addendum to 
the lease specifying the amount of rent to be paid for an 
additional specified period of time. This interpretation is not 
only wholly consistent with Pingree, but it was also the 
-14-
undisputed understanding of the parties. This was established at 
trial by the introduction of Exhibit 37D, the written addendum to 
the Lease Agreement entered into between Standard and English on 
September 1, 1985. 
The addendum to the Lease Agreement specified the amount of 
rent to be paid and the term of the extension. Furthermore, it 
was signed by both parties to the lease. See Addendum attached 
hereto. English himself testified at trial that it was his 
understanding that if the 1982 Lease Agreement was to be changed 
or amended, it was necessary to have any such change or amendment 
put in writing and signed by the parties to the lease. See Trial 
Transcript, Volume II, pp. 11-13. Such a writing, moreover, is 
required by the Statute of Frauds. 
A. There Was No Sufficient Writing Under The Statute Of 
Frauds To Extend The Enforceable Term Of The Rental 
Agreement Past August 31, 1988. 
The undisputed evidence at trial was that the last written 
addendum to the lease was executed in 1985 between the parties 
and that addendum expired by its terms on September 1, 1988. See 
Trial Exhibit 37D (included in the addendum hereto). No further 
written addendums were entered. 
The court's conclusion that the Lease Agreement was extended 
in November 1988 in the absence of any written addendum 
specifying the amount of rent to be paid, the term, and signed by 
both parties is not only inconsistent and contrary to the prior 
conduct of the parties and their stated understanding of the 
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necessity of an express written addendum for the extension of the 
lease, but it is also directly contrary to the requirements of 
the Statute of Frauds. 
At trial, defendant raised the defense of the Statute of 
Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1989), contending that any 
amendment, renewal or extension of the 1982 Rental Agreement had 
to be in writing sufficient to satisfy the statute.1 Trial 
Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 76-77 and Vol. Ill, p. 54-55. It was the 
trial court's conclusion that: 
[The] Statute of Frauds did not apply to the 
renegotiation since the 1982 lease was the 
writing in question, and that was the writing 
subject to the Statute of Frauds, and there 
was full compliance with the Statute of 
Frauds and the renegotiated price was not 
subject to the statute of frauds. 
Trial Transcript, Vol. IV, pp. 4-5. 
The trial court went on to say that even if the 
renegotiation of the Lease was subject to the Statute of Frauds, 
it found that the two checks from standard to English indicating 
$1,000 payments together with a demand letter from English 
demanding payments for rent and refurbishing of the premises 
constituted the specific writing necessary to amend or extend the 
During the course of the trial, the Court granted a 
Motion by English to amend the Complaint to Include a 
claim that the parties reached an oral agreement on 
rent on November 2, 1988. The Court also then granted 
Standard's motion to amend its Answer to include a 
defense based upon the statute of frauds, Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-5-3. Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 41-45. 
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Lease Agreement. Trial Transcript, Vol. IV, p. 5. These 
conclusions are contrary to the law and amount to the court 
writing an agreement never reached by the parties. 
Utah Code Ann. S 25-5-3 (1989) provides: 
Every contract for the leasing for a period 
longer than one year .... shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed 
by the party by whom the lease .... is to be 
made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 
There is no question that the 1982 Lease Agreement falls 
within the scope of contracts required to be in writing pursuant 
to § 25-5-3 and it is axiomatic that any material modification, 
amendment or renewal of a contract required to be in writing must 
likewise be in writing. Contrary to the trial court's 
conclusion, any modification of rent and extension of the 1982 
Lease Agreement was also required to be in writing and signed by 
English, "the party by whom the lease is to be made." 
The trial court also erred in its alternative conclusion 
that the two checks from Standard together with the December 2, 
1988 letter from English satisfy the writing requirement. The 
checks are insufficient writings in two fundamental respects. 
First, neither check is signed by either party. Testimony 
at trial indicated that the checks, Exhibits 17 and 18, were 
signed only by Standard's bookkeeper and financial officer, 
neither of whom was authorized to enter into a Lease Agreement or 
even purported to be so authorized. See Trial Transcript 
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Volume III, p. 28. English did not sign the checks at all. See 
Trial Exhibits, 17P and 18P (included in Addendum hereto). He 
testified only that he negotiated them. The negotiation of a 
check is evidence of nothing more than an intent to receive 
money. In fact, if anything is to be inferred from English's 
failure to endorse the checks it is that he intended to avoid 
their being construed as some evidence of an agreement with 
another party. 
Second, neither check contains any reference to a rental 
term. This, too, is an essential term to a Lease Agreement as 
acknowledged by English when he signed the 1985 Addendum to the 
Lease Agreement (Exhibit 37D). See also Trial Transcript, Volume 
II, pp. 11-13. 
English's letter to Standard also fails to satisfy the 
statute, even when considered together with the checks and 
circumstances at the time. The letter contains the following 
language: 
I am writing concerning the lease payments 
due for October, November and December. I 
appreciate your full payment of September and 
part of October. There still remains, 
however, $400.00 for October, $1000.00 for 
November, $1000.00 December, for a grand 
total of 2400.00. I would appreciate it if 
your bookkeeper would send us a check in that 
amount in full. 
We have three prospective tenants and are 
nearing completion of the required 
refurbishing. 
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I am hopeful we can get the unit rented, our 
settlement completed, and get back to 
business-as-usual soon, (emphasis added) 
Trial Exhibit 13P (included in addendum hereto). At the very 
most, this language could be evidence of an understanding on 
English's part that he had agreed to settle with Standard if it 
would pay $1000 a month until he was able to find a new tenant. 
The language of the letter is, in fact, inconsistent with an 
agreement for extension of the 1982 Lease Agreement in that it 
suggests no intent to provide Standard with possession or any 
control of the premises, and it discusses completion of 
"settlement." There is no indication that an agreement was 
reached to pay a rent of $1000 a month over three more years. 
No further significance is given to English's letter by the 
check English subsequently received on December 5, 1988 from 
Standard. Trial Exhibit 18P (included in addendum hereto). That 
check predated English's letter by one day and indicates nothing, 
other than a payment of $1000 to English. ,Id. 
The Statute of Frauds may be satisfied by consideration of 
one or more writings, not all of which are signed by the parties 
only if there is a nexus between them. Machan Hampshire v. 
Western Real Estate, 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah App. 1989). The 
nexus requirement may be satisfied either by an express reference 
in the signed writing to the unsigned writing or by a reference 
implied by the contents of the writings and the circumstances 
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surrounding the transactions. Id. In the instant case, neither 
type of reference is present. 
In addition, this Court has recognized that, to constitute a 
sufficient writing, the memoranda "must set out the conditions of 
the contract with adequate certainty." Id. (citing Collett v. 
Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730, 732 (1951)). 
[W]ritings must so clearly evidence the fact 
that a contract was made, what its terms are, 
"that there is no serious possibility that 
the assertion of the contract is false." 
Id. (citing 2A Corbin On Contracts, § 512 (1950)). Even assuming 
that a sufficient nexus between the various writings exists, 
there are no written memoranda containing the essential terms and 
provisions for renewal of the 1982 Lease Agreement. This is 
especially true when one considers the writings in light of the 
circumstances and actions of English surrounding their creation. 
See discussion under POINT II, infra. 
B. Summary. 
There was no evidence presented at trial which would provide 
any reason for inferring that the parties agreed to extend the 
valid period of the Lease Agreement. Both parties knew that a 
written addendum was necessary and they had prepared one for the 
previous extension. Their failure to make any effort to prepare 
a similar addendum on or after September 1, 1988 indicates only 
that no agreement extending the Lease under a new rental term was 
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reached. There is no legal or factual basis for a conclusion 
that an enforceable lease existed after August, 1988. 
POINT II 
ENGLISH'S REPOSSESSION OF THE LEASED 
PREMISES PRECLUDED THE 
EXTENSION AND/OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT. 
As of September 1, 1988, there was, as a matter of law, no 
enforceable contract between the parties. The lease could not be 
extended without the parties agreeing on a rental amount to be 
paid for a subsequent term. 
While the evidence is unrefuted that between September 1, 
1988 and November 2, 1988 no rental amount had been agreed upon, 
the court did find that a rental amount was orally agreed upon on 
November 2, 1988. R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, p. 10). The 
court also found that English subsequently received a check for 
$1,600 with markings indicating that $1,000 was to be applied to 
September rent and $600 to be applied to a partial payment for 
October rent and that a second check was issued by Standard to 
English in the amount of $1,000 on December 1, 1988. R. at 195 
(Findings of Fact, 11). 
Based upon these findings, the court concluded that the 
parties had agreed upon a rental term for the next 36-month term 
from September 1, 1988 to August 1, 1991 and that the lease 
remained in effect after September 1, 1988. These conclusions, 
however, are contrary to established law. Even assuming that 
Standard did promise on November 2, 1988 to pay $1,000 a month 
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through August 1991, such a promise or "agreement" was 
insufficient to extend the lease past August 1988. 
A. The 1982 Lease Agreement Was Not Extended For Lack Of 
Consideration From English. 
It is fundamental that a lease, like any other contract, 
requires consideration to be given by both parties. In exchange 
for a tenant's agreement to pay rent, the landlord must deliver 
consideration to the tenant in the form of possession of the 
property. The characteristics of a lease contract in the common 
law include "a conveyance of a right of exclusive possession." 
Bentley v. Palmer House Co., 332 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1964); Bodden 
v. Carbonell, 354 So.2d 927 (Fla. App., 1978); Gage v. City of 
Topeka, 468 P.2d 232 (Kan. 1970); Wash-o-Matic Laundry Corp. v. 
621 Lefferts Ave. Corp., 82 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1948); Restatement 
Second of Property-Landlord and Tenant, Section 1.2 (1977). 
In the absence of this consideration from the landlord there 
cannot be an enforceable lease. As the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals has stated, "A lease is partly the conveyance of an 
estate, which is deemed fully executed once the tenant takes 
possession." Matter of Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 41 (Id Cir. 1979). 
"[I]f the lessee is deprived of peaceable possession, the 
consideration for the contract fails. It necessarily follows the 
lessee's obligation to pay rent for these rights and privileges 
conferred by the lease is extinguished." Executive House Bldg., 
Inc. v. OPTIMUM Systems, Inc., 311 So.2d 604, 607 (La. 1975). 
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The evidence at trial was unrefuted that English proceeded 
to take possession of the leased premises during October 1988 and 
never varied from that course of action. On October 5, 1988, 
English sent a letter to standard giving "notice of pending 
lessee default for lease payments due September 1, 1988 and 
October 1, 1988." See R. at 192-193 (Findings of Fact, f 21), 
and Trial Exhibit IIP. There was no evidence at that time that 
the parties had agreed upon any rental amount. 
Subsequently, sometime on or before October 18, 1988, 
English contacted Gordon Hellstrom and other workmen with respect 
to beginning to refurbish or "repair" the leased premises. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 28 and 45. At that time, Standard had 
not been informed of English's intent to have work done on the 
interior of the leased premises. 
On October 18, 1988, English changed the locks on the leased 
premises without discussing it with Standard or receiving 
Standard's consent. Trial Transcript Volume II, pp. 18-19. At 
the same time, or shortly thereafter, at English's request, 
workmen began to do extensive interior work on the leased 
premises. See Trial Transcript Vol. I, p. 45. On October 20 
English's lawyer, Gary Doctorman sent a letter to Standard 
declaring that Standard was in violation of the Lease Agreement 
and demanding payment of rent. R. at 193 (Findings of Fact, H 
25); Trial Exhibit, 12P. Standard sent a check to English on 
October 20, but English subsequently returned it "because the 
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parties had not yet arrived at an agreed amount." R. at 194 
(Findings of Fact, 11 26). 
On or about November 2, 1988, a telephone conversation 
between Schubach of Standard and English took place. According 
to English's testimony at trial, Schubach called him to say that 
he agreed upon "the thousand dollars per month as the rental 
figure." Trial Transcript, Vol. I, p. 140. English testified 
that there were no subsequent writings signed by him or anyone at 
Standard confirming this conversation. Trial Transcript, Vol. 
II, pp. 22-23. Nonetheless, it is upon this conversation that 
the court bases its conclusion that the parties came to a 
sufficient agreement to effectively extend the lease for 36 
months beginning September 1, 1988. R. at 197-198 (Conclusions 
of Law, f 1). 
The evidence at trial, however, established nothing more 
than the fact that on November 2, 1988 Schubach said he would pay 
$1,000 per month. There was no offer by English to convey 
possession of the premises to Standard. In fact, in the same 
conversation on November 2, English asked Schubach to remove 
Standard's remaining property from the premises. Trial 
Transcript Vol. 1, p. 140. English did not tender the keys to 
the premises to Standard nor did he indicate any intent 
whatsoever to give Standard possession of the premises. 
English's course of action, beginning in the middle of 
October 1988, was only to repossess the premises and to exercise 
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complete control thereof. In fact, it was English's testimony at 
trial that, after October 5, 1988, his understanding was that 
Standard "basically had no rights under the lease." Trial 
Transcript Vol. II, p. 23. Consistent with his understanding, 
English's actions after October 5, 1988 never suggested any 
intent to deliver possession of the premises to Standard. There 
was thus no intent to give the necessary consideration in return 
for an extension of Standard's obligation to pay rent. 
The court found that Standard was never denied access to the 
leased premises. R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, in 29-32). While 
this may be true, it does not contradict the fact that Standard 
never had or was offered possession of the premises after English 
changed the locks on October 18, 1988. The evidence presented at 
trial indicated only that Standard employees were able to obtain 
a key to the premises from English for the purpose of removing 
Standard's remaining property as English requested. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. I, p. 139 and Vol. II, p. 36. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that where a landlord 
changes the locks on a leased premises he has deprived the tenant 
of possession, even where the lessee is able to obtain access 
upon demand. In Bass v. Planned Management Services, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated "A person should not have to demand access 
to a home which he or she is entitled to possess." 761 P.2d 566 
(Utah 1988). Other courts have similarly recognized that a 
tenant is deprived of possession although the landlord allows him 
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a key to remove his belongings. See, e.g., Wishod v. Kibel, 496 
N.Y.S.2d 544, 545-46 (1985). Thus, as a matter of law, the fact 
that English allowed Standard to enter the premises to remove its 
remaining property does not indicate that Standard had possession 
of the premises. The evidence is unrefuted that English took 
possession of the premises on or before October 18, 1988 and 
never again offered or conveyed possession to Standard. 
Because the evidence at trial indicates that English never 
gave any consideration to Standard in exchange for a promise to 
pay rent, there is no basis for any finding that the parties 
extended the valid term of the lease beyond September 1, 1988. 
To impose additional obligations on Standard beyond those imposed 
by the 1982 Lease Agreement and 1985 Addendum, additional 
consideration was required of English. The evidence is unrefuted 
that he never gave or offered Standard any additional 
consideration after October 18, 1988. It defies common sense to 
suggest that Standard would agree to be bound under the lease for 
three additional years in exchange for nothing. 
All the evidence presented at trial indicates English's 
intent to not offer the consideration required of the landlord in 
any enforceable lease. The trial court's Judgment, holding that 
from September 1, 1988 on, an enforceable lease existed between 
the parties, should be reversed. 
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B. Assuming There Was An Enforceable Lease, English 
Himself Breached It By Unlawfully Repossessing The 
Premises. 
Assuming arguendo there was an enforceable lease after 
August 31, 1988, English breached that lease when he changed the 
locks on October 18, 1988 and unlawfully repossessed the 
premises. 
In Aldrich v. Olson, 531 P.2d 825 (Wash. App. 1975), the 
Court of Appeals of Washington considered a case very similar to 
the instant one. In that case defendant, Olson, occupied a house 
owned by Aldrich. On September 17, 1971 Aldrich became concerned 
when she had not received rent from Olson which was due on 
September 1, 1971. Aldrich attempted to contact Olson by 
telephone at his home and work. She learned that Olson had quit 
his job and his previous employer was unaware of his whereabouts. 
Aldrich subsequently entered the lease premises with her own key 
and discovered rotten food, garbage, and that certain items of 
furniture and belongings had been removed from the property. 
Aldrich thereupon cleaned up the garbage in the premises and 
changed the locks on the doors without giving notice to defendant 
Olson. Several days later, Olson returned to the premises, broke 
the lock, and removed his remaining property. 531 P.2d at 
827-28. The Court of Appeals assumed the validity of the trial 
court's inference that Olson was no longer staying at the 
premises and was intending to remove the remainder of his things, 
but, nonetheless, stated: 
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The most that can be said of those facts is 
that Olson no longer intended to occupy the 
premises. Intention not to occupy is not 
necessarily an intention to surrender the 
premises to the landlord and abandon the 
leasehold estate. Legal abandonment 
contemplates both an act or omission and an 
intent to abandon. . . . abandonment must be 
established by clear, unequivocal and 
decisive evidence. 
Aldrich, 531 P.2d at 828 (citing Tuschoff v. Westover, 395 P.2d 
630 (Wash. 1964)). 
The court in Aldrich found no support for any conclusion 
that defendant intended to abandon his interest in the leasehold. 
Under the circumstances, there was no clear, unequivocal and 
decisive evidence that Olson had abandoned the leasehold prior to 
September 18, 1971. The court held that there was no support 
for Aldrich1s action of changing the locks to the exclusion of 
Olson's rightful possession. "Accordingly, the 'lockout1 
constituted an unlawful eviction." Aldrich, 531 P.2d at 830. 
The Aldrich court approvingly cited a law review article stating: 
An eviction by the lessor suspends the 
lessee's obligation to pay rent during the 
time he is kept out of possession. And 
instead of resorting to an action to recover 
possession, the lessee may treat the lease as 
terminated, thus relieving himself of any 
obligation to pay rent which would otherwise 
accrue thereafter. This rule applied when 
the eviction is constructive as well as 
actual. 
In the instant case, the evidence at trial indicated that, 
while Standard had moved its operations for this particular store 
elsewhere, it still had property on the premises. Trial 
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Transcript, Vol. I, p. 139. Standard was furthermore still in 
the process of negotiating rent, as evidenced by English's letter 
of October 5, 1988. Trial Exhibit IIP. In addition, Standard 
continued to pay utilities and, unaware of the lockout, tendered 
payments to English on October 20th. Trial Transcript, Vol. I, 
p. 134. 
English's unlawful repossession of the premises precludes 
him from recovering under the lease. Implied in every lease is a 
covenant of quiet enjoyment. An unlawful entry and eviction 
clearly constitutes a breach of this covenant. Where a landlord, 
in the absence of an abandonment by the tenant, unlawfully 
changes the locks on the leased premises, the landlord is himself 
in default under the lease and cannot "retrench and take 
advantage of his own reentry rights; he is precluded from 
recovering the rents thereafter accruing." Olin v. Goehler, 694 
P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wash. App. 1985). 
Generally recognized principles of contract law furthermore 
preclude a party from enforcing a contract which he himself has 
breached. That is the case here. Even assuming there was an 
enforceable lease agreement after August 31, 1988, English 
himself breached the agreement by unlawfully evicting Standard 
and is, thus, precluded from seeking any recovery for any 




Because of English's repossession of the premises, there is 
no basis for a finding of a default by Standard and, therefore, 
the Judgment awarding costs, attorneys1 fees and lost rentals 
should be reversed. In addition, and for the reasons discussed 
above, the Judgment providing for retention of jurisdiction 
should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR FINDING STANDARD 
LIABLE FOR DAMAGE OR LACK OF REPAIRS. 
Because there was no enforceable lease between the parties 
after August, 1988, Standard was obligated only to return the 
leased premises to English on September 1, 1988 "in as good a 
condition as the premises [were] at the commencement of this 
lease, with only ordinary wear and depreciation being accepted." 
See R. at 189 (Findings of Fact, f 2). There was insufficient 
evidence presented at trial for the court to find that Standard 
failed to satisfy this obligation. Plaintiff presented no 
evidence whatsoever of the condition of the premises at the 
commencement of the 1982 lease. 
Without any basis for a finding on the condition of the 
premises at the commencement of the lease, this Court cannot find 
that Standard failed to leave the premises in a sufficient 
condition on September 1, 1988. In addition, there is no 
evidence of the condition of the premises at the time of the 
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termination of the lease on or about September 1, 1988. There is 
thus no basis for any comparison of conditions upon which an 
award for damages to the premises can be based. 
The 1982 Lease Agreement, by its express terms, obligated 
Standard only to do repairs to the "premises during the term of 
[the Lease Agreement]." See Trial Exhibit 4P, p. 3 (included in 
Addendum hereto). The record is devoid of any evidence that 
English gave notice to Standard of any breach of the lease with 
respect to repairs or damage prior to November, 1988 — a full 
two months after expiration of the lease. 
In fact, there is no evidence that any damage was done 
during the lease term and not repaired by Standard before 
September 1, 1988. Items such as the furnace were not inspected 
until late October or November 1988. Trial Transcript Vol. I, 
pp. 28, 31 and 33. It is perfectly possible that the furnace was 
operating properly as of September 1, 1988 and even through early 
October. There is no evidence to indicate otherwise. In the 
absence of an enforceable lease through November 1988, there is 
no basis other than mere speculation for a finding that Standard 
breached an obligation to maintain the premises in good repair. 
At the very most, the evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient only to establish a removal of fixtures from the 
premises. Any damage resulting from the removal of fixtures was 
more than offset by the $2,600 English received after October 
1988. 
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The judgment should accordingly be reversed to exclude all 
items of damage. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court erred in 
interpreting the law and awarding judgment in favor of W. Daniel 
English. The judgment below should be reversed and judgment 
entered in favor of Standard Optical Company, 
DATED this /ffi^day of October, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MART1NEAU 
By 
George A. Hunt 





UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 25-5-3 
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS 25-5-3 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the 
sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or 
some note or memorandum thereof is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto autho-
rized in writing. 
History: ILS. 1898 & CX. 1907, § 2463; 
CX. 1917, § 5813; ILS. 1933 * C. 1943, 
33-5-3. 
AUGUST 10, 1982 LEASE AGREEMENT 
A S I L i l H I i i l 
j THIS AGREEMENT made and executed in duplicate this 10th day of 
j August, 1982 by and between W, Daniel English as party of the first part and 
hereinafter called the Lessor, and Standard Optical Company, of Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as party of the second part and hereinafter 
'* called the Lessee. 
W I T N E S S E T H 
if 
|i That in consideration of the payments hereinafter reserved to be paid 
!i 
Ji by the Lessee to the Lessor and the terms and provisions of this agreement 
il 
!' to be kept and performed by each party to the other, the Lessor does by 
ij 
i . 
J these presents hereby let and lease unto the Lessee, who does hereby agree 
,i 
1
 to accept as leased property and premises and in accordance with the terms and 
;i 
;< provisions of this agreement, the following described office space and 
i; 
,' premises situated in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
!i more particularly described as follows: 
i! 
|| Commercial unit one (1) in the building located at 3525 Market 
Street, in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
|| containing approximately two thousand-one hundred (2100) aquare 
feet of floor space together with available parking space 
jl allocated on percentage of total square footage each tennant 
;, occupies of total building square footage. 
i 
i' 
!i To have and to hold said premises and office space under the terms 
li mz 
jj of this agreement for a term of ten (10) years beginning on the 1st day of 
[j the month following written notice to Lessee from Lessor, and terminating 
I 
jj at midnight on the last day of the same month ten years hence. 
The Lessee does hereby unconditionally agree to pay as rent for the 
, demised premises and to the Lessor, or order, at West Valley City, Salt Lake 
! County.Utah, the sum of $1000.00 each month for 36 months vith the first 
i 
such installment payment to be due and payable on or before the 1st day of 
September, 1982, and each installment payment to be due thereinafter by on 
or before that same calendar day during the term of the agreement. A grace 
period of five days is given for the making of any such installment payment. 
The monthly rent specified in the section above shall be negotiated 
every 36 months. 
It is mutually understood and agreed by these parties that the demised 
premises herein will be used by the Lessee as a retail optical business and 
Lessee does hereby agree to use said premises for no other purposes without , 
the written consent of the Lessor first had and obtained, however, such consent: 
will not be unreasonably withheld. I 
The Lessor does hereby agree to pay the general taxes assessed against 
the property and premises herein as belongs to the Lessor during the term J 
of this agreement. The Lessor does also agree to furnish and pay for water 
for the leased premises and to maintain the exterior of the building in which 
these leased premises are located, except the glass, which shall be the 
responsibility of the Lessee and as hereinafter provided. 
The Lessee does hereby agree to promptly pay the charges for gas, heat, 
electric service and telephone service, and to pay the taxes assessed 
against all personal property of the Lessee as may be in or on the leased 
premises, during the term of this agreement. J 
It is mutually understood and agreed that the premises herein leased 
are in a condition of excellent repair and that the heating units and air 
conditioning units, gas meters and electric meters are provided so as to 
furnish seperate service to the respective tennants in this main building, and 
with respect thereto it is understood and agreed that the Lessee herein will 
be responsible for the installations of the gas and electric meters and 
deposits thereon in the event the same is required by such respective companies 
The Lessee does hereby agree to at all times during the term of this agreement 
keep the heating and air conditioning units in a condition of good repair. 
The Lessee hereby accepts the leased premises in a condition of good 
repair and does hereby agree to at all times during the term of this 
agreement to maintain the interior of said demised premises and keep the same 
in a condition of good repair at all times, and agrees not to make any 
alterations to the demised premises without the written consent of the Lessor 
first had and obtained, and then that all such alterations shall be made at 
the sole expense of the Lessee and that any such alterations as are then made 
a part of or attached to the building shall remain with the premises and become 
the property of the lessor at the end .o* this least* terr. 
The Lessee does likewise agree to provide suitable floor covering (carpet, tild, 
etc) of his choice in said premises, to be responsible for all repairs done or 
needed to be done to the interior of the demised premises during the term of 
this agreement. I 
It is mutually understood and agreed that in the event the demised 
premises are damaged or destroyed by fire or other causes beyond the control 
of the parties herein, that the Lessor shall have the right and option as to i 
whether or not the premises and building shall be repaired or rebuilt, and in 
the event the Lessor elects to make the needed repairs or to rebuild that an 
equitable rental adjustment will be made during such time as the repairs 
or rebuilding is being done, and on completion that the regular rental 
payments will again become due and payable. In the event the Lessor elects 
not to rebuild or repair the premises, then it is agreed that the Lessor may 
declare this agreement terminated in which event both parties will be excused 
of any further performance of the terms and provisions herein provided. 
The Lessee does hereby agree to be responsible for all breakage to 
windows and doors in the demised premises and not to install any signs on the I 
demised premises without the permission of the Lessor. i 
The Lessee does hereby agree to accept the demised premises in a state 
of good repair and be responsible for all costs for the installation of the 
equipment of the Lessee in said premises. | 
As a material part of the consideration for this lease, the Lessee 
covenants to carry adequate liability insurance, i.e. $100,000 - $300,000 in 
connection with the use of occupation of the leased premises and in connection 
with his business practice; and the Lessee covenants to save the Lessor's 
premises from any claim or suit which may arise for any injury to any person 
entering upon said leased premises, arising from the use of leased premises 
by Lessee or the entry or exit of any patient or other person, or from the 
failure of Lessee to keep the leased premises in a safe condition, with the 1 
exception of negligence of Lessor. 
The Lessee shall not sublet any portion of the leased premises without 
the written consent of the Lessors first had and obtained. Nor shall the 
Lessee assign this lease in whole or in part without the written consent of 
the Lessors. Nor shall an assignment for the benefit of creditors or to a 
Lessee, be deemed an exception to the prohibition against assigning or i 
i 
subletting the leased premises. If Lessee sublets any portion of the office, ' 
I 
with written consent, over and above present agreed rent, then one-half of the! 
sublet rental shall be added to total rent of Lessor. | 
It is agreed that the Lessor will not be liable to the Lessee on account 
of any damage to any property of the Lessee in the demised premises on 
account of the lack of any repairs to any equipment in the demised premises 
as is the responsibility of the Lessee to repair and maintain, and that the 
Lessor shall have the right to any reasonable inspection of the demised 
i 
premises at any reasonable time during the term of this agreement. The . 
Lessee does hereby agree to at all times keep the interior of the demised 
premises in a clean and sanitary condition in accordance with all good and | 
reasonable standards of like commercial units. I 
It is mutually agreed Lhat in the event of the failure, neglect or J 
default of the Lessee to make payments herein provided, as they become due, j 
or within the grace period, that the Lessor shall have the right and option i 
to proceed under the terms of the following provisions, or either of then: 
(a) To declare this agreement terminated and proceed, with or without 
i 
legal process, to take possession of the demised premises and in which event • 
i 
this agreement will be terminated and each and both parties will be excused ? 
of any further performance of the terms and provisions herein set forth, or 
(b) To take any action necessary to evict the Lessee from the demised 
premises, and proceed to make any and all necessary repairs to the property 
and proceed to rent the same to any other person, and in the event it is i 
necessary for the Lessor to take a reduction in the rental rate on said ' 
demised premises that the Lessee will pay to the Lessor, all expenses in I 
connection with such repairs, r^rjnting and any loss of rentals, as may be 
determined by the rates set forth herein. In this respect it is agreed thai: 
time is of the essence of this agreement and that the terms and provisions 
herein set forth will extend to and become binding upon the respective heirs, 
executors, administrators and assigns of these parties, and that the Lessee 
shall have no right to make any assignment of any rights under the terms of 
this agreement. 
The Lessee does hereby agree to turn said premises back to the Lessor at 
j the end of this lease term in as good a condition as the premises are at the 
j 
j commencement of this lease, with only ordinary wear and depreciation being 
i! excepted. 
. The Lessee does hereby agree that all rental charges due by the terms of 
if 
this agreement will be a first lien upon all property of the Lessee in the 
demised premises and that no part of such fixtures or personal property will 
.«.\be removed from the demised premises until all rental charges are paid. 
It is mutually agreed that in the event it becomes necessary for either 
party to enforce the terms of this agreement with court action, after default, 
that the party determined to be in default will pay to the opposite party all 
court costs and a reasonable attorneys fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the said parties have hereunto placed their 
signatures on the day and the year first abovs written 
W. Daniel English 
Lessor 
LESSEE 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the /-^ day of, , 1982, personally appeared 
before me ^k^j^c^c^ -&/. ^*>^<^£~<^&*^J? , the signer of the above instrument^ 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executecPthe same. 
il 
My Commission Expires: 
1/ 
LESSOR 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Notary Public 




who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the sant> 
_, 1982, personally appeared 
, the signer of the above instrument, 
ADDENDUM TO THE AUGUST 10, 1982 LEASE AGREEMENT 
StptmbzA 7, 1915 
jj Addendum to tvut agreement batuun Standard Optical Company o{ Salt Lakt 
Y.City, Utah ktKunaitiK talltd tkt Ltutl and W. Vanitl tngluh, kvtUnaiWi 
Kcalltd tht LU*OK. 
VoAAQKaph 4, pagi 1 o{ agKumtnt i i changtd to Ktad ok iollcm: 
* 
"The Leiiee dou hvuby unconditionally agKtt to pay a* Ktnt 
(OK tht dvnUtd pKtmtiu and to tht LtMOK, OK OKdtK, at VtAt 
VaUUy City, Salt Lakt County, Utah, tht turn o^ $U00.00 tAch 
month ioK 16 month* vUth tht iUut such vatattmtnt paptnt to be 
due and payablt on OK bt{oKt tht lit day o{ September, 11 tS9 and 
tach Jjut&Untnt paymtnt to 6t due thVLtinaltvi by on OK bt{0Kt 
that *amt tattndoK day dusting tht ttw oi tkt agKttmtnt. A 
SKact pvuLod o{ jive day* i i jiven {OK tkt making o{ any Mich 
<AUaUmtnt paymtnt.9 
IW WITNESS vmtOr tht said paKtiu kavt ktxtunto placed thtU iigmttu/iei 
on tht day and tht ytM {iKU above mitten. A 
DECEMBER 2, 1988 LETTER TO KLAUS RATHKE 
FROM DANIEL W. ENGLISH 
jm. jD«mel JEn^Ii.l,. J D J D . ^ . . Jit*. 2S21 (A«rlui Jtirvri 
, t^tmif M i l * 
December 2, 1988 
KlauA Rathke 
759 J / 2 SooCfe M&cn 
Salt lake City, Utah 
Good Morning Klaus, 
841U 
I am uniting concerning tiie lease payment* due £or October, 
November and Vecvnber. I appreciate your £uli payment o& 
Septwben. and pant oj OctoboJu_ There stltljiernaA ns^Jhpweven., J^ 
^^.OO.^oAJkJ^zii.^JlMP^0 Nbvmb2^,(^J^00^00 VecmS^^or'f^ 
a grand total o^ $2400.00. T would apprecXaXe*X JL^ your 
bookkeeper would 6end us a check In that amount in &ull. 
We have had three prospective tenants and are nearlng 
completion o& the required refurbishing. 
I am hopeful we can get the unit rented, our settlzment 
completed, and get back to buslness-as-uAuai soon. 
W. Vanlel English, VJV.S 
OCTOBER 20, 1988 CHECK TO W. DANIEL ENGLISH 
FROM STANDARD OPTICAL COMPANY 




SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
O "MCE I E INVOICE NUM8ER 
800-00 
l0Cp*0D 1 a r . M , MM 
AMOUNT c DISCOUNT 
2 - 0 0 .
 O o 






158% SOUTH MAIN 
SALT LAKE COY, UTAH 64111 
MAIN OFFICE 
TRACY COLUNS BANK * TRUST 
107 SOUTH MAIN STREET 










PAY ******1.600* DOLLARS AND #00* CENTS 
W DANIEL ENGLISH 
GRANGER PLAZA SUITE #3 
3531 SO MARKET ST 






PAY THIS AMOUNT 
^**J^£^e£3£'< 
84119 
-J * —fl 
"•00 70 6 5"' Ml 21,0006 IUH OOiSflqi 5"' 
. / / 
-3F 
w- & 
DECEMBER 1, 1988 CHECK TO W. DANIEL ENGLISH 
FROM STANDARD OPTICAL COMPANY 








DESCRIPTION A JUNT DEDUCTION 
• 8 7 3 7 0 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
— ^ V 
A JL^ /^^J> -fi 
TOTALS 
NET AMOUNT 
1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
STANDARD OPTICAL 
DATE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT DEDUCTION 
B 7 3 7 0 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
<ECK DATE 





1 , 0 0 0 - 0 0 
1 , 0 0 0 • 0 0 
STANDARD OPTICAL 
159Vfe SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CTTY. UTAH 84111 
TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST 
MAIN OFFICE 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
31-61/1240 




DATE CONTROL NO. 
12/01/88 1007 
W DANIEL ENGLISH 
GRANGER PLAZA SUITE #3 
3531 SO MARI El ST 









»*00 7 5 15"* «: i 21,0009, IUH 0 0 158 S I 5«* 
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. DANIEL ENGLISH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. 900422-CA 
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the following parties by causing a true 
and correct copy thereof to be hand-delivered: 
Gary E. Doctorman, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
50 West 300 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
DATED this /f^ day of October, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
George A. Hunt 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellant 
